We generalize results of earlier work on learning in Bayesian games by allowing players to make decisions in a nonmyopic fashion. In particular, we address the issue of nonmyopic Bayesian learning with an arbitrary number of bounded rational players, i.e., players who choose approximate best-response strategies for the entire horizon (rather than the current period). We show that, by repetition, nonmyopic bounded rational players can reach a limit full-information nonmyopic Bayesian Nash equilibrium (NBNE) strategy. The converse is also proved: Given a limit full-information NBNE strategy, one can find a sequence of nonmyopic bounded rational plays that converges to that strategy.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of myopic Bayesian learning by a finite number of bounded rational players has been addressed by Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1994) . Recently, Kim and Yannelis (1997b) extended that work by allowing the number of bounded rational players to be arbitrary, i.e., any finite or infinite set or a continuum. Here, we drop the myopia assumption and allow the players to be nonmyopic i.e., to make decisions by taking into account the future.
In particular, the description of the model is as follows: Let ( , F, µ) be a probability measure space interpreted as the set of states of the world. Let T denote the time horizon and A the set of players. A repeated Bayesian game (or a repeated game with differential information) is a sequence of games {G t : t ∈ T } such that for each t, G t = {(F The strategy x α = {x t α : t ∈ T } of player α is a sequence {x t α : t ∈ T } where each component is F t α measurable and x t α (ω) ∈ X t α (ω), µ-a.e. and for all t ∈ T . Given E t α (ω), for each player α and for each strategy profile x t = {x t α : α ∈ A} in period t, define the conditional expected utility v α (ω, x t ) of player α as
where q α (ω | E t α (ω)) denotes the conditional probability of ω , given E t α (ω). We define player α's total discounted expected utility U α (ω, x) for the strategy profile x = {x t : t ∈ T } as
] is a strategy profile x = {x t : t ∈ T } such that, for all α ∈ A and for µ-a.e.,
for all strategies y α . The NBNE ε captures the idea of a bounded rational player in the sense that each player chooses approximate or ε-best-response strategies by taking into account the future decisions. We call players who choose NBNE ε equilibrium strategies bounded rational, or we say that the play is bounded rational.
Learning in this model takes place as follows: The private information of player α in period t + 1, denoted by F t+1 α , is given by
where x t is the projection of a NBNE(G * ) on the tth coordinate and F t α ∨ σ (x t ) denotes the join, i.e., the smallest σ -algebra containing F t α and σ (x t ). Consequently, for each player α and period t, we have
Expression (1) represents a learning process for player α. LetF
whereF α is the pooled information of player α over the entire horizon
where X α , u α , q α are defined as above andF α is given by (2), is called a limit full-information Bayesian game.
Notice that the above setting is more general than the one of Kim and Yannelis (1997b) . In particular, by letting the discount be equal to zero, we are reduced to the Kim-Yannelis framework. The questions that we address (and for which we provide positive answers) are the following:
1. Can nonmyopic bounded rational players by repetition reach a limit full-information NBNE outcome? 2. Conversely, pick a NBNE strategy for a limit full-information game. Can we construct a sequence of bounded rational plays that converge to that strategy?
In a different setting and for a less general Bayesian game framework than ours, question 1 has been addressed by Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Nyarko (1996) . Question 2 is addressed for the first time in a nonmyopic setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains notation and definitions. Section 3 describes the Bayesian game with differential information with finitely many players. Section 4 proves the existence of a NBNE(G * ). In Section 5, we describe how learning takes place. In Section 6, we prove that nonmyopic bounded rational players will reach a limit full-information NBNE outcome and, conversely, given a limit full-information NBNE outcome, we can construct a sequence of bounded rational nonmyopic play that converges to the limit NBNE outcome. Section 7 addresses the same questions as those in Section 5 but in a Bayesian game with a continuum of nonmyopic players.
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
If X and Y are sets, the graph of the set-valued function (or correspondence), φ : X → 2 Y , is denoted by
Let ( , F, µ) be a complete, finite measure space, and let X be a separable Banach space. The set-valued function φ : → 2 X is said to have a measurable graph if G φ ⊗ β(X), where β(X) denotes the Borel σ -algebra on X and ⊗ denotes the product σ -algebra. The set-valued function φ : → 2 X is said to be lower measurable or just measurable if for every open subset V of X , the set
Let ( , F, µ) be a finite measure space and let X be a Banach space. Following Diestel and Uhl (1977) , the function f :
→ X is called simple if there exist
→ X is said to be µ-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple functions f n :
In this case, for each E ∈ F, we define the integral to be
It can be shown [see Diestel and Uhl (1977) 
It is a standard result that normed by the functional · p above, L p (µ, X ) becomes a Banach space [see Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 50) ]. Let X : → 2 Y be a correspondence, where Y is a Banach space. Also, let u : × Y → R be a real-valued function. can be decomposed into an atomless part 1 and a countable union of atoms 2 . The following result from Balder and Yannelis (1993, Theorem 2.8) states: Suppose that a.e. in 1 , X (ω) is convex and closed, u(ω, ·) is concave and upper semicontinuous on X (ω) and u(ω, ·) is integrably bounded. Suppose further that for all ω ∈ 2 , X (ω) is weakly closed and u(ω, ·) is weakly upper semicontinuous on X (ω). Then,
is weakly upper semicontinuous on the weakly closed set
A corollary of the above result says that if is countable and X (ω) is weakly closed and u(ω, ·) is weakly continuous, then U is weakly continuous as well.
A Banach space has the Radon-Nikodym property (RNP) with respect to the measure space (T, T , ν) if for each ν-continuous vector measure
It is a standard result [see Diestel and Uhl (1977) ] that if Y * (the norm dual of Y ) has the RNP with respect to (T, T , ν), then
We close this section by defining the notion of a martingale and stating the martingale convergence theorem. Let I be a directed set and let {F i : i ∈ I } be a monotone increasing net of sub-σ -fields of F (i.e.,
We denote the above martingale by {x i , F i } i∈I . The proof of the following martingale convergence theorem can be found in Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 126) 
e.g., Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 129) ] that if the martingale {x i ,
, it also converges almost everywhere, i.e., lim i→∞ x i = x almost everywhere.
THE GAME WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION
Let T be a countable set that denotes the time horizon. An element of T is denoted by t. Let ( , F, µ) be a complete, finite, separable measure space, where denotes the set of states of the world and the σ -algebra F, the set of events. Let Y be a separable Banach space and A be a set of agents (which is any finite or infinite set).
A repeated Bayesian game (or a repeated game with differential information) is a sequence of games {G t : t ∈ T } such that for each t, Y of agent α in period t, i.e.,
A typical element of L X α is denoted by x α = {x t α : t ∈ T } and is a sequence of strategies for player α over the entire horizon, where each element of the sequence belongs to
A typical element of L X is denoted by x and of L X −α by x −α . We endow all product spaces with the product topology.
Throughout the paper, we assume that for each α ∈ A and each t ∈ T , there exists a finite or countable partition P t α of . Moreover, the σ -algebra F t α is generated by P t α . For each ω ∈ and t ∈ T , let E t α (ω) ∈ P t α denote the smallest set in F t α containing ω and assume that, for each α and for each t,
For each ω ∈ and t ∈ T , the conditional (interim) expected utility function
where For each ω ∈ , the total discounted conditional (interim) expected utility of agent α,
is interpreted as the total discounted expected utility of agent α, when he/she is using the sequence of strategies x α (ω), the realized state is ω, and the other agents employ the sequence-of-strategies profile x −α .
A nonmyopic Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G * = {G t : t ∈ T } [denoted by NBNE(G * )], is a strategy profile x * ∈ L X such that, for all α ∈ A,
Given an ε > 0, the strategy profile x * ∈ L X is said to be an ε-NBNE ε (G * ) if, for each α ∈ A and µ-a.e.,
EXISTENCE OF A NBNE(G * )
We can now state the assumptions needed for the existence of an NBNE(G * ). First, we will establish the weak continuity of the total discounted expected utility. Once this is done, the existence of a NBNE(G * ) follows from [Kim and Yannelis (1997a) or Yannelis (1997) ]. We need the following assumptions:
Y is a non-empty, convex, weakly compact-valued and integrably bounded correspondence, having an F t α -measurable graph. Assumption 2. Proof. It follows from Kim and Yannelis (1997b, Lemma A.1 ) that the conditional expected utility v α (ω, x t −α , x t α (ω)) is weakly continuous for each t ∈ T . We need to show now that the total discounted expected utility,
is weakly continuous as well.
Because the set T is countable, the desired result follows from Balder and Yannelis (1993, Corollary 2.9 ).
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Since U α is weakly continuous, concave and F-measurable and the sets X t α satisfy Assumption 1, all conditions of the Kim and Yannelis (1997a) or Yannelis (1997) equilibrium existence theorem are satisfied and therefore we can conclude that a NBNE for G * exists.
NONMYOPIC LEARNING
As we mentioned in the preceding sections, T denotes the time horizon. Agents enter the game having private information about the states of nature and they choose a sequence of actions to maximize the approximate (or ε) total discounted expected utility, given that the other players have chosen an ε-optimal strategy. At the end of each period, each player observes the equilibrium strategies of all the players. This observation generates new information, and agents refine their partitions. More formally, let σ (x t ) denote the σ -algebra that the NBNE(G * ) generates in period t. Then, the information of player α in period t + 1, denoted by F t+1 α , is given by
where x t is the projection of a NBNE(G * ) on the tth coordinate and F t α ∨σ (x t ) denotes the join, i.e., the smallest σ -algebra containing F t α and σ (x t ). Consequently, for each player α,
This represents a learning process for player α.
whereF α is interpreted as the pooled information of player α over the entire horizon T . A one-shot Bayesian game,
where X α , u α , q α are defined as before andF α is given by (4), is called a limit full-information Bayesian game.L X and NBNE(Ḡ) are defined for the Bayesian gameḠ in a way analogous to that with L X and NBNE(G * ) in the game G * . Note thatF α may or may not be the same as the full-information ∨ α∈A F α , which is the pooled information over all players.
NONMYOPIC LEARNING IN FINITE BAYESIAN GAMES
We now state our first result that nonmyopic bounded rational play converges to a limit full-information NBNE.
THEOREM 2. Let G * = {G t : t ∈ T } be a Bayesian game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 and let {x t : t ∈ T } be a sequence in NBNE ε (G * ). Then, there exists a subsequence {x t n : n = 1, 2, . . .} of {x t : t ∈ T } such that {x t n : n = 1, 2, . . .} converges weakly to x * ∈ NBNE(Ḡ).
Proof. Let {x t : t ∈ T } be an element of NBNE ε (G * ). First, notice that, from Diestel's Theorem [see, e.g., Kim and Yannelis (1997b, Lemma A. 3)], each L X t α is weakly compact. From the measurability constraints, it follows that for each t ∈ T , L X t ⊂L X . Because x t ∈ L X t for each t andL X is weakly compact, it follows from the Eberlein-Smulian Theorem [Dunford and Schwartz (1958, p. 430)] , that there exists a subsequence {x t n : n = 1, 2, . . .}, such that x t n converges weakly to x * ∈L X . Hence, for each α, x * α isF α -measurable.
Fix α ∈ A and ω ∈ . Let y α (ω) ∈ X α (ω) be a strategy in the limit fullinformation Bayesian gameḠ. We need to show that x * is a NBNE forḠ, i.e., that µ-a.e.,
. Suppose by way of contradiction that for some player α ∈ A and for D ⊂ with µ(D) > 0, there exists y α (ω) such that, for all ω ∈ D, 
where (ρ − ε)/2 > 0. Thus,
Then, we have
and by rearranging, we obtain 
